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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Natu re Of The Case
Martin Garcia-Pineda appeals from the district court's order reversing the
magistrate's denial of the state's motion to correct an illegal sentence. GarciaPineda contends the district court erred in concluding the magistrate lacked
authority to suspend any portion of the community service requirement set forth
in I.C. § 37-2738.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Upon investigating a report of "stolen property and narcotics activity," law
enforcement obtained a search warrant for Garcia-Pineda's residence. (R., pp.24.)

The search revealed marijuana concealed in an Altoids' tin.

(R., p.3.)

Although Garcia-Pineda initially denied ownership of the marijuana, he later
admitted the marijuana belonged to him.

(R., pp.4-5.)

As a result, law

enforcement issued Garcia-Pineda a citation for possession of marijuana. (R.,
p.1.)
Garcia-Pineda pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3). (R., p.12.) The magistrate imposed a gO-day
jail sentence, with 87 days suspended, and placed Garcia-Pineda on probation
for 18 months. (R., p.12.) The magistrate also imposed 100 hours of community
service but suspended 80 of those hours. (R., p.12.)
Approximately one month later, the state filed an I.C.R. 35 motion,
asserting the sentence was "contrary to law" because the magistrate did not
"impos[e] the statutory minimum required number of hours of community
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service."

(R., p.13.)

The magistrate denied the motion, concluding it had

inherent authority to suspend a sentence. (8/22/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-10.) The
state appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate. (R., pp.16-18,
21-29.)

Garcia-Pineda filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's

Memorandum of Decision on Appeal. (R., pp.21, 31-33.)
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ISSUES
Garcia-Pineda states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Whether the District Court Erred in Holding That the
Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In Suspending the
Imposition of Community Service as a Term of Probation.

B.

Whether the District Court Erred in Reversing the Magistrate
Court's Decision Denying the Appellant's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence.

(Appellant's Brief, p.2 (formatting altered).)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Garcia-Pineda failed to establish error in the district court's decision
that the magistrate lacked discretion to suspend any portion of the community
service imposed as required by I.C. § 37-2738?
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ARGUMENT
Garcia-Pineda Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Decision
Reversing The Magistrate's Denial Of The State's Request To Correct GarciaPineda's Illegal Sentence
Introduction

A.

Garcia-Pineda claims the district court erred in reversing the magistrate's
denial of the state's request to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the district
court erroneously concluded the magistrate did not have discretion to suspend
the majority of the community service required by statute.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.2-5.) A review of the relevant statutes and applicable legal standards shows
Garcia-Pineda's claim fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kL

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kL

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981 )).

4

The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P .3d 1155, 1158 (Ct.
App. 2011). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction."

C.

kL

The Magistrate Did Not Have Authority To Suspend Any Portion Of
Garcia-Pineda's Community Service
Idaho Code § 37-2738(5) governs sentencing criteria in drug cases and

provides:
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of
the provisions of [subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of section 37-2732,
Idaho Code] shall, when granted a probationary period of any sort
whatsoever, be required by the court to complete a period of not
less than one hundred (100) hours of community service work.
(Emphasis added.)
Garcia-Pineda does not dispute that he was convicted of an offense that
subjected him to the requirements of I.C. § 37-2738(5). Instead, Garcia-Pineda
contends the magistrate could suspend a portion of the 1DO-hour community
service requirement and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-5.) Garcia-Pineda is incorrect.
Because Garcia-Pineda pled guilty to a qualifying offense and was
granted probation, the plain language of I.C. § 37-2738(5) required the
magistrate to order Garcia-Pineda to complete a minimum of 100 hours of
community service. Nothing in I.C. § 37-2738(5) or any other provision of law
authorized the magistrate to suspend any portion of the community service
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requirement. The Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. Steelsmith, 288
P.3d 132 (Ct. App. 2012), is instructive.
In Steelsmith, the district court did not impose the statutorily mandated
driver's license suspension until it relinquished jurisdiction. 288 P.3d at 135. The
Court of Appeals held that although a trial court generally cannot increase a
sentence once it has been executed, which occurs when the defendant is
transferred to the custody of the Board of Correction, Rule 35 allowed the court
to impose the suspension when it did because the absence of a mandatory
license suspension in Steelsmith's original sentence made the sentence illegal.

.!5t

at 137.

As explained by the Court of Appeals, "A suspension of driving

privileges under [I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d)] is mandatory, and therefore Steelsmith's
original sentence was illegal to the extent that it did not include a license
suspension."

lfl

The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to the

court's addition of certain mandatory fines .

.!5t

As in Steelsmith, Garcia-Pineda's original sentence was illegal because it
failed to order him to complete the 1DO-hour community service requirement
mandated by I.C. § 37-2738(5). Thus, the district court correctly concluded the
magistrate erred in denying the state's motion to correct Garcia-Pineda's illegal
sentence. In reaching this conclusion, the district court interpreted the 1DO-hour
community service requirement as a term of probation that the sentencing court
could not modify unless the defendant showed he was "not capable of
performing" the requirement. (R., pp.27-28.) Although the 1DO-hour requirement
set forth in I.C. § 37-2738 is only required when the defendant is granted
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probation, the state submits it is not a term of probation, but is a mandatory
sentencing requirement that may not be modified by the court under any
circumstance. 1
However, even if the community service requirement is a statutorily
mandated condition of probation as opposed to a mandatory sentence, as
Garcia-Pineda argues, he has failed to cite any authority to support his claim that
a court has inherent authority to suspend a statutory condition of probation.
Garcia-Pineda's reliance on State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971),
to support such a proposition is misplaced. (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) In McCoy,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required mandatory
imposition of 10 days in jail upon conviction for driving under the influence. The
Court

held

the

statute

"unconstitutional

and

therefore

nUll,

void

and

unenforceable" because, the Court concluded, it interfered with the common law
authority of the judicial branch to suspend a defendant's sentence. McCoy, 94
Idaho at 241, 486 P.2d at 252. The opinion in McCoy, however, predated the
amendment to section 13, article V of the Idaho Constitution, which states, in
relevant part: "the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any
crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory
minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed
shall not be reduced."

I To the extent this Court concludes the district court's rationale was erroneous,
the Court may still affirm the result based upon the correct interpretation of the
statute. Boise Tower Assoc., LLC. v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 782, 215 P.3d
494, 502 (2009) ("Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory.").
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Garcia-Pineda acknowledges, as he must, that regardless of what the
Court held in McCoy, the Idaho Constitution authorizes the legislature to require
mandatory sentences and the courts must enforce those statutes. (Appellant's
Brief, p.3.) Nevertheless, Garcia-Pineda attempts to draw a distinction between
the legislative authority over sentences recognized in section 13, article V, and
legislative control over probationary terms, asserting that the absence of any
language in the constitution governing probation necessarily means a court can
disregard a statutorily mandated term of probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-3.)
McCoy certainly does not support such a claim, as it did not address this
particular issue, and Garcia-Pineda has failed to cite any other authority that
does.
Moreover, Garcia-Pineda's attempt to parse the constitutional authority set
forth in section 13, article V, is not persuasive. The 1DO-hour community service
requirement in I.C. § 37-2738(5) is part of a legislative scheme governing the
sentencing criteria for defendants convicted of certain drug offenses, and it falls
squarely within the authority granted to the legislature by the Idaho Constitution.
The magistrate had no discretion to disregard the mandate of I.C. § 37-2738(5)
and Garcia-Pineda has failed to offer any reasoned legal basis for concluding
otherwise.

His claim that the district court erred in reversing the magistrate's

denial of the state's Rule 35 motion fails.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decision reversing the magistrate's denial of the state's motion to correct GarciaPineda's i"egal sentence.
DATED this 13th day of December, 20~r:

JESSldA M. LORELLO
Deputy iAttorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of December 2012, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JOSEPH F. JAMES
Brown & James
130 4th Avenue West
Gooding, ID 83330
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